Kraków 2007-07-24
197 Section 1964-06-01
OKB Suchoj Su-7 B (BM, BKŁ, U)
History Su-7 B in Poland
Naddźwiękowy samolot bezpośredniego wsparcia na polu walki i uderzenia jądrowego.
The history of the Su-7 aircraft.
In November 1949, Pavel Osipovich Sukhoi’s OKB was disbanded. Officially, it was said that the aviation industry was being reorganized. In fact, the reason was that Pavel Sukhoi had fallen out of favor with Stalin. Pavel Sukhoi, together with a group of designers, joined Andrei T. Tupolev’s team as a brigade. Pavel Sukhoi even became Tupolev’s deputy. But he never gave up on the idea of a fast fighter aircraft. He even prepared several projects on his own.
In 1953, after Stalin’s death, the Sukhoi bureau once again became independent and quickly began to implement new projects. In general, there were two projects. One was designated S-1, the other T-3. These were fighters of a very similar design, but differed in the wing.
The S-1 was a front-line fighter with a swept wing and a single turbojet engine. The construction of the prototype was completed in 1954. The first flight was performed by the test pilot Andrei Kochetkov, on 1955-09-08. Andrei Kochetkov performed 12 test flights, after which he was recalled to the OKB S. Lavochkin. He was replaced by Vladimir Mikhalin. Later, N. Korvushkin joined the flights and it was he who performed the first flight on the second prototype. In December 1957, N. Korvushkin on the S-1 reached the highest speed in the CCCP, 2,170 km/h. It should be noted that it was planned to achieve 1,800 km/h. In addition, the prototype in horizontal flight reached an altitude of 19,000 m.
Unfortunately, as in other offices, the Sukhoi OKB did not avoid tragedy. In the autumn of 1957, state tests of the S-1 aircraft began. On 1957-09-21, during flight tests, pilot I. Sokolov died. As a result of engine failure in flight at low altitude during approach to landing.
For the first time in the CCCP, a movable air intake cone and a plate-type horizontal tail were designed for the S-1 aircraft right away. The aircraft’s armament was exceptionally avant-garde. Artillery armament, i.e. cannons, was completely abandoned. Unguided rocket missiles (n.p.r.) were used, and in the future, it was planned to use guided rocket missiles (k.p.r.).
The development of the S-1 aircraft was the S-2, which in 1958, was put into serial production as a front-line fighter under the designation Su-7. However, few copies were built. The army did not really need such an aircraft, because there were already suitable front-line fighters. It was therefore decided to adapt the aircraft to attack ground targets. With appropriate equipment and armament, the aircraft was designated S-22. The design passed state tests and was sent for production under the designation Su-7 B.
Aircraft versions.
S-1 – 1955, prototype of a front-line fighter. From the very beginning, it was equipped with a central movable cone and a horizontal plate tail. The swept wings (60 degrees) were equipped with one pair of aerodynamic guides. The armament consisted exclusively of unguided rocket missiles (e.g.r.).
S-2 – 1958, prototype of a front-line fighter modified. The fuselage was lengthened and improved aerodynamically, paying attention to the “area rule”. Four air brakes were installed on the fuselage. A second pair of aerodynamic guide vanes was added to the wings, at their ends. The structure was prepared to carry guided missiles (K.P.R.).
Su-7 – this is the S-2 in serial production. A dozen or so copies were built.
Why did Poland need the Su-7 B aircraft?
To answer this question, we must first answer another question, namely, – What role did Moscow assign us through the Warsaw Pact in a future armed conflict?
No one doubts that at the end of the 1950s the Cold War was in full swing. Poland, like other countries, was thinking about defending itself against possible aggression. There was even a document entitled – Defense Doctrine of the Polish People’s Republic. Of course, it was actually a military doctrine developed in Moscow for each of the dependent countries, within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.
The document was super secret, and only a narrow group of generals had access to it. The document contained, among other things, the following formulations;
“… One of the guiding principles of our operational doctrine has become the view that nuclear-missile weapons are currently the main means of solving tasks…”
“… The operational doctrine of the Polish armed forces is subordinated to the general strategic doctrine of the forces of socialism. Without denying the importance of defense, we give priority to offensive operations. The operational tasks of Poland within the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact provide that after the outbreak of armed conflict, the Polish Army is to develop offensive operations in the north-coastal operational direction, to a depth of 500-800 km, in a strip of 200 to 250 km, at a rate of 60 to 80 kilometers per day…”
What was the attack on the West supposed to look like?
The Polish People’s Republic was to send two armies to attack the West – armored and mechanized. They were planned to attack north – towards Denmark. They were to be supported by the so-called ABROTs, or Army Operational-Tactical Missile Brigades, and fighter-bombers equipped with nuclear weapons. ABROTs were equipped with R-170 missiles, and later R-70, R-300.
Air tasks were assigned to one air regiment. In the event of a “W” situation, i.e. the outbreak of war, the CCCP military was to provide nuclear weapons for these aircraft, as well as for the ABROT formation.
The procedure for transferring warheads and bombs was one of the most closely guarded secrets in the Polish People’s Republic. The secrets of Poland’s nuclearization were contained in sealed envelopes kept in the safes of successive first secretaries of the Polish United Workers’ Party, bearing the inscription: “Open in case of war”. The envelopes were destroyed in 1989, on the orders of General Wojciech Jaruzelski.
Theory of World War III.
During the war, our army would receive an order to attack Denmark. The probable direction was Schleswig Holstein and the occupation of Danish territory. The Soviet strategic goal was to reach the Skaggerak and Kattegat straits, the North Sea and the Atlantic.
The first wave would include CCCP divisions stationed in the GDR and Czechoslovak divisions, as well as the Polish Army and Soviet troops stationed in Poland. In total, about two million soldiers. The first front would be the CCCP forces in the GDR, the second – the Czechoslovak army, the third – the Polish front, which Wojciech Jaruzelski says belonged to the second strike forces. But this was a lie. Polish forces were to join the fight six to eight hours after the order was issued, probably during the third day of the war. They were therefore considered by Moscow to be the closest strategic reserve for the first strike.
Why on the third day of the war? It was assumed that if the West used nuclear weapons, it would be to create a zone of destruction in Poland by an atomic attack, preventing the march of further divisions from the CCCP area. The Polish Army would be needed to save what was left of Poland. Moscow’s game was for the West to be the first to use nuclear weapons.
600,000 Polish soldiers were to march on Germany, Denmark, and then Belgium and the Netherlands. Although we would not be able to achieve these goals. Our units were to shed Polish blood to open the way for the Soviets to the heart of Europe.
The Russians also set us a second direction of attack – precisely to the west. Anticipating the facts, in the 70s our air force was not able to support both of these directions of attack. Also, directing and controlling the troops attacking in two directions would be very difficult.
Simultaneously with the attack of conventional forces, the Russians planned to support the attack of Polish troops with a nuclear attack on the very important strategic port in Esbjerg, and … dropping an atomic bomb on Copenhagen. This missile was to be dropped by a Polish pilot…
For such an invasion by Warsaw Pact troops, NATO could respond in only one way: with a nuclear missile attack on Polish territory. NATO would not attack the territory of the GDR and the FRG because of the troops of both sides stationed there. An attack on the territory of the CCCP was not considered, at least at this stage of the war. Why? Because the Soviets would respond with a massive nuclear attack on the USA, using intercontinental missiles.
All transport lines ran through Polish territory and it was our country that would be hit by nuclear missiles. This was also mentioned in the “Polish” military doctrine. “…It must be anticipated that the enemy will strive to create strategic nuclear barriers. The following areas should be considered as probable targets for nuclear strikes: Silesian Industrial Region, Warsaw, the Tri-City area, Łódź, and Poznań, Szczecin, Wrocław, Kraków. Strikes on communications are most likely in the area of the Poland-CCCP border. An exact forecast of the scale of strikes is difficult. However, if we assume for the first days of the war an approximate number of 50 to 60 nuclear strikes with a total power of 25 to 30 megatons, then the losses caused by these strikes would have to amount to between one million two hundred and two million people, and a very large area of the country would be radioactively contaminated.” A charge counted in kilotons fell on Hiroshima, which is 1,000 times smaller.
In the 1970s, a super-secret Polish air squadron stationed in Powidz conducted reconnaissance of targets for possible nuclear attacks in Denmark. This was done from the deck of a specially equipped, seemingly outdated Ilyushin Il-14 transport aircraft, circling the Baltic Sea. No one was allowed to contact the personnel of this squadron. However, to this day (2000), the people who ordered and endorsed with their orders these very operations, codenamed “Beryl”, are still alive.
The best way to drop an atomic bomb by air was to fly to the target at high speed just above the ground, rapidly gain altitude, detach the bomb in ascending flight, and then – after making a combat turn – quickly escape at low altitude. This method ensured unnoticed approach to the target, and then time to move away from the bomb explosion site and its impact zone. It must also be remembered that an atomic bomb does not require a control system, because its impact force is enormous.
We have reached the point where the document exists and we need to start implementing it. In order to prepare for the tasks imposed by Moscow, combat units had to be designated and equipped with the appropriate equipment.
What aircraft? At the end of the 50s, Poland had an Ilyushin Il-28 bomber, with subsonic speed and a payload of 3,000 kg. This type was not suitable for a quick nuclear attack. Our military saw the Yakovlev Yak-26/27/28 aircraft as successors to the Ilyushin Il-28 reconnaissance bomber. However, these aircraft were never exported, and they were never officially accepted into service in the CCCP itself.
In such a situation, we were forced to purchase new equipment in the form of Sukhoi Su-7B fighter-bombers. The 3rd Aviation Regiment, located in Bydgoszcz, was designated to operate them.
Sukhoi Su-7B.
The real development of the Sukhoi Su-7 aircraft was brought about by the concept of atomization and missileization of the battlefield, promoted by the Soviet military authorities in the 1950s. The main role of carrying nuclear charges on the tactical battlefield was to be played by z-z class missiles and barrel artillery, however, to eliminate some particularly mobile targets (troop columns) or those requiring a precise strike (nuclear means of enemy destruction, secured command and communication posts), it was planned to use a fast supersonic aircraft as a carrier.
Due to its high speed, large payload, powerful engine, appropriate range and, equally importantly, the need to quickly introduce the aircraft into service (before the Su-7 B, provisionally modified MiG-15 / -17 were used for this role), the design of the Sukhoi OKB was chosen.
The prototype of the fighter-bomber version was designated with the index S-22-1, and its basis was one of the last series-built fighter aircraft, the Su-7. The internal fuel capacity was increased, for this purpose the wings were used to create chambers for an additional 420 liters each (now a total of 3,455 liters), and if necessary, two spare fuel tanks of 2 x 600 liters were installed under the fuselage. A total of 4,655 liters.
In addition to two under-fuselage suspension nodes, the aircraft received the ability to carry weapons on two under-wing nodes, with a lifting capacity of 2 x 500 kg.
In typical, conventional ground support missions, 2-4 (depending on whether it had fuel reserve tanks) FAB-500 M 54 or M 58 bombs were suspended, sixteen-barrel UB-16-57 U launchers with S-5 type anti-tank missiles, seven-barrel APU-14 U launchers with S-3 K anti-tank missiles, single PU-12 launchers with S-21 missiles and PU-12-40 U launchers with S-24 missiles.
In the attack with an atomic bomb, the planned armament consisted of one atomic bomb, which was to be suspended on the left node under the fuselage. The right node and two nodes under the wings were intended for additional fuel tanks. First, the fuel from the additional tanks under the wings was to be used, which were to be discarded after emptying. The aircraft was not planned to be refueled in the air. For the nuclear attack, the aircraft was to be deprived of its gun armament, in order to reduce the aircraft’s weight and, consequently, increase its range.
The aircraft received a modified version of the engine designated as the AL.-7 F 1-100 with a service life increased to 100 hours.
The fuselage, compared to the previous version, received a much larger number of various hatches and visors facilitating the work of ground technicians. In all combat aircraft of the Su-7 family, the cockpit fairing was opened manually by moving it backwards. A single braking parachute was installed in a special recess at the rear of the fuselage.
The radio equipment of the Sukhoi fighter-bomber prototype consisted of a VHF radio station RSIU-5 W, a radio compass ARK-5, later replaced by the ARK-10 model, a radar device corresponding to the IFF Kremniy-2 system, a warning station against radiation by the radar beam of the aircraft’s rear hemisphere type SPO-2, also known as Syrena-2. The Su-7 B aircraft (as well as subsequent modifications) received the option of mounting an AFA-39 camera under the front landing gear bay and taking vertical photos.
Flight tests, production and operation. 1959.
The S-22-1 aircraft first took to the air on 1959-04-24, piloted by the Sukhoi OKB pilot Yevgeny Solovyev. Tests conducted using weapons from under-fuselage nodes, and in particular unguided missiles, once again revealed the engine’s tendency to overboost, this time caused by the exhaust gases of the missiles. To prevent this, the engine received the KS-1 installation, which automatically reduced its revolutions when missiles were used and after a while also automatically restored the initial engine revolutions. The installation did not fully solve the danger of overboost. Additional operational restrictions were introduced for flights with heavy S-24 missiles.
In mid-1960, the aircraft was recommended for serial production, the first units came off the production lines in the second half of 1960. As of 1961-01-24, the aircraft designated as Su-7 B was officially accepted into the armament of the Soviet Army Air Force.
The first fighter-bomber regiment, which replaced its previous MiG-15 aircraft with the new Su-7 B, was stationed in Martynowka in the Odessa Military District. The opinions of the line pilots performing the flights were critical of the new aircraft. The pilots complained in particular about the constantly occurring engine pumping and its susceptibility to damage by solid objects. Another modification of the Arkhip Lulka engine was to remedy this. Individual improvements and modifications were introduced successively to the models on the production line. First of all, the new AL.-7 F-1-100 U engine received a modified compressor. The blade rings were enlarged and could be adjusted in three positions. This drive was installed from 1962.
The suction of foreign bodies from the runway was partially eliminated (from the 26th production series) by shortening the main landing gear by 113 mm, which caused the front of the aircraft, and thus the air intake, to rise slightly upwards.
In turn, from the 28th series, the aircraft received four additional engine cooling air intakes, from the 8th series, the 31st series aircraft received a new front landing gear leg with a new shock absorber, from the 33rd series, the previously installed KS-2 ejection seat was replaced with the KS-2 A model, the Su-7 B produced from the 33rd series received an emergency air pressure receiver moved from the central to the left-hand side position and an additional tip measuring the angle of slip and attack (DUAS device, also known as a pennant) was additionally mounted on this receiver. The resulting aircraft were produced in 33 series, their numbers were a continuation of the previously created twelve series of Su-7 fighters, so they were in the range of 13-45.
The Su-7 B aircraft was first demonstrated at the air show in Tushino near Moscow in 1961. 21 machines were demonstrated in the air.
Just two years after the launch of serial production, the Su-7 B saw the light of day of its modernization, which was initiated by the creation of the S-22-2 prototype. This aircraft was to be the final version carrying nuclear weapons. Initially, the Su-7 B aircraft did not carry nuclear weapons, because such weapons were only being developed for them and were implemented in 1962, in the form of the 8U49 nuclear bomb with a power of initially 5 kT, and later in various versions from 1 to 10 kT. In order to fully utilize the power of this means of destruction, it was necessary to install appropriate aiming equipment and avionics.
The S-22-2 received the PBK-1 bombardier’s sight (replaced by the PBK-2 from the 55th series) automatically determining the moment of drop depending on the aircraft’s speed, altitude and angle of climb. The aircraft also has: a radio station RSIU-5 W, a radio altimeter of low altitudes RW-UM, an automatic pilot AP-28J-1 (used from an altitude of 1,000 meters and maintaining the aircraft’s position at the time of its launch), a new ejection seat KS-3. The cockpit received red lighting. The Su-7 BM (M as in Russian Modernizovannyj) received a substitute for a modern active control system in the form of a two-channel damper D-2K-110, which from an altitude of 2,000 m slowed down the deflections of the controls and automatically corrected the aircraft’s departure from the flight path.
The engine has an increased service life, initially to 150 (AL.-7 F1-150), and then to 200 hours of operation (AL.-7 F1-200). The aircraft received two landing lights (Su-7 B one) and a taxiing light. Some of the equipment was replaced with newer ones. Emergency landing gear extension was made easier (a single lever instead of the relatively complicated procedure from Su-7 B). The aircraft’s operational range was increased, thanks to larger wing tanks (670 liters each). Now the airframe held 3,955 liters of fuel and additionally adapted underwing nodes to carry 600-liter suspended tanks. The aircraft can therefore take 6,355 liters for ferrying.
All these changes increased the aircraft’s empty weight by about 600 kg.
The S-22-2 tested basic nuclear weapons, the aforementioned light bomb type 8U49 was carried individually on a lock under the fuselage. The aircraft tested new conventional weapons in the form of FAB-500 M62 bombs, which with their slim silhouette were more suitable for supersonic flights, replacing the previously used M54 and M58. The APU-14U launcher (it had a large cross-section, which affected air resistance and aircraft performance) and PU-12 (it was abandoned in favor of using only the S-24 missile with the PU-12-40U launcher) were also abandoned.
The S-22-2 configured in this way took to the air for the first time in 1962, its serial equivalent Su-7 BM appeared in units in 1963. It was produced until 1965, because in that year production of another newer version was started. The production series of the Su-7 BM are numbers in the range of 46-56, i.e. 11 series were built.
The Su-7 BM is the first aircraft of the Sukhoi OKB used outside the CCCP. It is also the first version of the Su-7 to enter service with the Polish Army.
Su-7BKL (Russian: Koliesno-Lyzhny).
This version was developed on the wave of ideas to enable heavy supersonic aircraft to use smaller airports. Work on the Su-7 was carried out in two tracks: work was carried out on both rocket launch accelerators and skids on the wheeled landing gear.
The first of these projects was based on the serial Su-7 B and designated as S-25, created in 1960. The aircraft was characterized by two SPRD-110 powder launch accelerators mounted in the lower, central part of the fuselage, with a thrust of 1,300 – 3,000 kG (dependent on air temperature) and an operating time of 10-17 seconds. They were used by the pilot when the aircraft was accelerated to a certain take-off speed, and then immediately after take-off and use they were dropped using pyro-cartridges.
In addition, the S-25 received fuselage fuel tanks enlarged by 270 liters (now the aircraft carried 3,925 liters), two braking parachutes mounted at the base of the vertical stabilizer and a system for blowing off the boundary layer from the flaps on the trailing edge. The S-25 tests, which lasted until 1964, allowed the introduction of the above-mentioned improvements to the serial machines (apart from the system for blowing off the boundary layer), which will be discussed later.
A little earlier, in 1959, work began on another prototype designated as the S-23 (based on the Su-7), which instead of the classic wheeled landing gear received special skates. The system proved particularly useful during landing, because the skates did not get stuck in the relatively soft ground, while during takeoff they exerted much greater resistance than the wheels. Therefore, after some time, the front skate was abandoned in favor of the wheel. Only skids were placed on the main legs. But after a frosty night, the skids froze to the ground and the plane could not be moved. Then an oil installation was built, which fed oil under the skids. The system worked, but only on airports with a dirt surface. Ultimately, such a landing gear was abandoned.
In 1962, another prototype, the S-22-4 (based on the Su-7 B), was flown. It was decided to work on a different landing gear, a skid-wheeled one. The skids were mounted on the outside of the main wheel and automatically lowered by hydraulic actuators to the edge of the wheels when the aircraft landed on a ground surface. When taking off or landing from a concrete surface, the skids remained in their initial position and the aircraft used the standard wheeled landing gear for this purpose.
Research on the modified skate landing gear was resumed in 1963, with the development of the S-26 prototype (based on the Su-7 BM). This aircraft received an improved version of the skates known from the S-23 (the modified wheel remained at the front), to reduce their resistance during take-off, especially from a concrete surface; the system received a special skid-cooling installation. It was planned to put the aircraft into production under the designation Su-7 BŁ, but ultimately, due to its complexity, the project was abandoned.
In 1962-1964, factory tests were carried out, and in 1964-1966, state tests of the S-22-4 aircraft using some elements from other prototypes. The aircraft was recommended for serial production in 1965, as the Su-7 BKL. Apart from the aforementioned (in the case of the S-22-4 description) skid system, the aircraft received SPRD-110 take-off boosters, enlarged fuel tanks, two large braking parachutes (all tested on the S-25), ASP-PF-7 semi-automatic sight (replaced by ASP-PFM-7 in the 1970s), KS-4 ejection seat (allowed to leave the aircraft from 0 m altitude at a minimum speed of 140 km/h), AL.-7 F1-250 engine (250 hours of service life, engine weight 2,103 kg, fuel consumption 0.9 kg/kg/h), thinner armoured windscreen to improve visibility, reinforced aerodynamic combs, air brakes and horizontal stabilizer, new additional fuel tanks of 950 liters each. The armament was strengthened, and thanks to the reinforcement of the wings for new spare fuel tanks, the aircraft received an additional attachment point under each wing (installed since 1969) with a load capacity of 2 x 250 kg.
However, there were several limitations to their use, first of all they could not be used in the case of suspension of large fuel tanks of 950 liters under the internal attachment points. Additionally, the same type of armament had to be used on each of the wings: either bombs or rockets (due to the same electrical connections of the armament control system to both suspensions). In the 1970s, a new launcher for the S-5 missiles was introduced, it was the UB-32A-72 with 32 guides. Work was also undertaken to adapt the aircraft to carry guided weapons (Ch-23, Ch-25, Ch-28), but it was not completed.
Also in the same decade, Su-7 family aircraft were adapted to carry under-wing jamming pods of the SPS-141, SPS-142 and SPS-143 type, depending on the expected band of jamming frequencies.
Production of the Su-7 BKL aircraft was carried out in 1965-1971 and ended with the construction of about 500 units in series numbered 57-80.
Su-7 U (Russian: Uchiebnoy).
Due to problems with the first serial Su-7 aircraft, the development of the training and combat version was postponed. The lack of this aircraft caused many problems in training young pilots for the aircraft that was so difficult to fly, such as the Sukhoi.
Two prototypes of the training aircraft, designated as U-22-1 and U-22-2, were built in the second half of 1965. Pilots were still waiting for this aircraft, so the machines soon passed factory tests, and then state tests, and the first serial aircraft took to the air in April 1966. Its production was carried out until 1971.
The two-seater Su-7 U was based on the Su-7 BM aircraft. In order to build a second cabin in the fuselage, the front part of the fuselage had to be extended by 200 mm. Additionally, the equipment previously located behind the pilot’s seat was moved to the upper fairing extending from the cabin to the vertical stabilizer. The fuselage fuel tanks were also rebuilt, but their capacity did not change. The cockpits had two covers that opened pneumatically upwards.
The tandem arrangement of seats, one behind the other on the same level, combined with large seats and equipment construction prevented the instructor sitting in the back from having any visibility of what was happening in front of the plane. Of course, this was unacceptable. The rear cabin was equipped with two tilting mirrors made of well-polished metal. It worked on the principle of reflecting the image seen in the upper piece of metal (on the upper cover of the cabin at a working angle of 45 degrees) in a piece located in the middle of the cabin. In other words, it was a typical periscope. The device had certain limitations. It could not be used at speeds higher than 600 km/h. The air resistance would simply destroy the upper part of the metal. One pull of the lever by the instructor was enough and the upper element of the periscope assumed a safe angle of 0 degrees. After some time, reinforcements were made, which allowed flights at speeds of up to 850 km/h with the periscope open. The crew received a special version of the KS-4U-22 ejection seats. Interestingly, the pilot’s seat always fired first, followed by the instructor’s, regardless of who initiated the exit from the aircraft. The landing gear (often treated badly by young pilots, especially during landings) and its brakes were strengthened. The front landing gear leg was equipped with brakes and could be controlled hydraulically. The landing gear braking system received an installation that sprayed the wheel hubs with alcohol, cooling them more effectively.
The increase in the weight of the entire aircraft resulted in restrictions on the weapons carried, the maximum load capacity of the suspensions was limited to 2,500 kg, some machines did not receive the left-wing 30 mm cannon. However, the possibility of carrying nuclear bombs was retained. The sight used on the training aircraft is a modification from the Su-7 BM designated as ASP-5ND-7U, replaced from the 12th production series by the newer ASP-PF-7U.
Su-7 UMK
Export version of the training aircraft, distinguished primarily by a different type of radio station, a different IFF radar system. Unlike the Soviet prototype, it did not carry nuclear weapons. Its production took place in 1968-1970.
Su-7 B in the Polish Army. 1964.
The decision to purchase Su-7 B aircraft for military use was made at the turn of 1962-1963, and Bydgoszcz and the 3rd Air Regiment were chosen as their base. The initial contract was for 36 single-seat aircraft and 6 training, two-seat aircraft, which constituted the staffing of one regiment with three squadrons.
Our air forces received their first 6 Su-7 BM (53 series) a few months after Czechoslovakia, in June 1964. These were the only aircraft in the Su-7 BM version.
We received the next 12 Su-7 BKŁ in 1966. All these aircraft were stationed in Bydgoszcz.
The next deliveries were; 1968 – 2 Su-7 BKŁ, 1969 – 3 Su-7 U, 1971 – 4 Su-7 BKŁ, 1 Su-7 U, 1972 – 12 Su-7 BKŁ, 1973 – 1 Su-7 U.
In the years 1974-1977 – 4 Su-7 U (delivered together with Su-20 to Powidz). In 1986, these aircraft were transferred to the 3rd Air Regiment in Bydgoszcz.
As for the location of the Su-7 aircraft, there is no doubt that it was the Bydgoszcz airport. The base was huge with a large base. In the first half of the 70s, at least 30 shelters-hangars were built there for the aircraft, which still exist today (2007). Repair workshops for such unique aircraft were also organized there.
However, there are some blank spots regarding the name of the aircraft host and the facility. We know that in August 1964, the 5th Fighter-Attack Aviation Regiment received the distinguishing name “Pomorski”. In accordance with Order No. Pf-40/MON of the Minister of National Defense dated 1964-08-25, on the granting of the historical name to the 5th PLMSz.
This happened exactly at the time of taking over the first Su-7 aircraft into service with the Polish Army. Three Air Squadrons were created from these aircraft in Bydgoszcz. Since the regiment operating these aircraft was strictly subordinated to the Warsaw Pact, its tasks had to be different from those of the assault regiments, which at that time commonly operated the Lim-6 bis assault aircraft. Therefore, further changes took place already in May 1967, when the regiment took over the heritage, tradition and name and number of the 3rd Assault Aviation Regiment, becoming the 3rd Pomeranian Fighter-Bomber Aviation Regiment. This was based on Order No. 07/MON of the Minister of National Defense dated 1967-05-04, on the transfer of historical names and numbers of front units to military units and the establishment of annual unit holidays. In the second half of the 1960s, a group of pilots and technicians underwent special training in Soviet units on the territory of the CCCP. This training was related to the use of nuclear weapons. Pilots practiced bombing techniques from a low-altitude, ascending flight. An imitation nuclear bomb was used for this purpose. A tactical nuclear bomb (at that time called an atomic bomb) called 6U-57 was carried on the left under-fuselage node. The right under-fuselage node carried an additional fuel tank. Additional fuel tanks were carried in the same way on the under-wing nodes.
In this form, the 3rd Pomeranian Fighter-Bomber Regiment lasted for many years. In February 1982, it was subordinated to the commander of the 3rd Brandenburg Fighter-Bomber Division. This was the result of our air force preparing to accept more modern Su-22 aircraft, while leaving the Su-7 aircraft in service. This was done on the basis of the order No. 06/DWL of the Commander of the Air Force of 1982-02-23.
For the 3rd PLM-B the next change took place only in September 1988, when due to the ending service life of the Su-7 aircraft the regiment was renamed the 3rd Pomeranian Air Training and Combat Regiment. The Su-7 aircraft, starting with the Su-7 BM version, were gradually withdrawn from service, and PZL TS-11 Iskra aircraft were introduced in their place.
In Poland, Su-7 aircraft were used until June 1990. As a result of the Helsinki Agreements, on the reduction of combat assets capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the use of Su-7 in the Polish Army came to a definitive end. Some of the aircraft were scrapped, but a significant number of them ended up in museums, mainly in 1994.
On 1992-03-06, a ceremonial disbandment of the unit took place, during which the regiment’s banner was said goodbye. On 1992-04-30, the 3rd Pomeranian Training and Combat Aviation Regiment was disbanded.
As a result of various events, 1 Su-7 BM (1970), 5 Su-7 BKŁ (1969, 1982, 2 x 1984, 1987) and 1 Su-7 U (from the 7th BB-R in Powidz) were lost.
It is worth noting that one Su-7 BKŁ nb 023 was transferred to the Czechoslovak Air Force in exchange for an aircraft accidentally shot down by a Polish MiG-21 PFM in 1971.
At the beginning of 1988, the CCCP military transferred one Su-7 BKŁ to Poland in exchange for an aircraft destroyed in 1987 by a Soviet pilot during a flight to a repair facility.
Written by Karol Placha Hetman