Krakow, January 31, 2005.
Chapter April 18, 2003. Poland
The genesis of the selection of a new multi-role combat aircraft (MWA).
The genesis of the selection of a new multi-role combat aircraft (MWA).
Discussions on the selection of a MWA for Poland began almost immediately after the socio-political transformation began in 1989. On December 4-5, 1990, an official US delegation, led by Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, visited Poland. The delegation included representatives from McDoonnell Douglas, Boeing, and Lockheed. Following the visit, Ministry of National Defense spokesman Lieutenant Colonel I. Czyżewski stated: “The news about the decision to purchase F-16 aircraft is false. We are indeed interested in modern equipment and are exploring options, but no decision has been made.”
In 1990, Poland recognized the need to purchase combat aircraft from NATO countries, but due to the ongoing PZL-230 Skorpion/Kobra light combat aircraft program, only a small number of aircraft were considered abroad. This is evidenced by a statement by Colonel Pil, Professor. E. Zabłocki – Commander and Dean of the Faculty of Military and Air Defence at the National Defence University – “I believe we will not produce F-15 and F-16 class aircraft and are forced to purchase them. There is a danger that, for financial reasons, there will be as many of them as there are currently MiG-29s (12). How will we supplement them? We need to look for a dominant aircraft, with an air-land capability. At least 200 such aircraft, at an appropriate technical level, will allow us to be a partner for NATO.” (At that time, we were not yet a NATO member.)
The more tangible PZL I-22 Iryda/Orkan was considered as competition for the PZL-230 Skorpion/Cobra. However, anticipating the facts, it should be noted that liberal-post-communist policies effectively thwarted not only plans for a Polish combat aircraft, even one of the caliber of the Italian-Brazilian AMX, but also for a trainer aircraft.
In August 1991, at an air show celebrating Polish Aviation Day, F-15s, F-16s, and Mirage 2000s graced Polish skies. Poland began to be perceived as a potential market. Between 1993 and 1997, the US government and Lockheed Martin repeatedly proposed that Poland purchase F-16s originally intended for Pakistan. In April 1997, the assembly and production of F-16s at the PZL Mielec plant was proposed, provided the F-16 won the planned tender.
The F/A-18 Hornet was offered by Boeing. The Swedes, with their SAAB JAS 39 Gripen, and the French, with their Mirage 2000, were interested in the Polish market. Moscow-based companies also submitted offers: the MiG-29 and a “package” of Su-30s and Su-39s. Polish politicians considered at least five alternative offers.
The Destruction of the Polish Armaments Industry.
In the Polish-language press after 1995, there was a palpable tone of impatience and pressure on politicians to select a new foreign fighter. In reality, they were more interested in crippling the Polish aviation industry. For example, in 1996, the newspaper “Wprost” wrote that “Western companies have been seeking participation in the modernization of the Polish Air Force for almost two years.”
In November 1996, the Parliamentary National Defense Committee announced that a tender for the WSB would be announced in 1997. On September 2, 1997, Deputy Minister of National Defense, Kazimierz Węgrzyn, said: “The team I lead has thoroughly assessed the current Polish Air Force equipment. The list of requirements for the future WSB is currently being approved, and a system for evaluating foreign bids is being prepared. However, the Ministry of National Defense has not decided to launch a tender. Due to the size of the expenditure, decisions had to be made by the Government and the Sejm. However, I believe that the tender process will begin this year.” At that time, funding and orders for Polish-made aircraft were also systematically reduced. There was a need not to waste the scarce funds.
First attempts to purchase the WSB.
In 1997, Minister of National Defense Stanisław Dobrzański sent a letter to the defense ministers of France, Sweden, the UK, the USA, and Moscow. According to the letter, Poland intended to equip its air force with at least 80 new military aircraft. Another 70 aircraft could be purchased by 2012.
In February 1998, the commander of the Air Force and Air Defense (WLiOP), Major General Kazimierz Dziok, urged Jerzy Buzek’s government to take concrete action regarding the selection of a new military aircraft. The Ministry of Defense responded by stating that it was waiting for offers.
In 1998, a team of Ministry of National Defense experts was established to analyze various aspects of leasing F-16 and F/A-18 aircraft.
In July 1998, Minister of National Defense Janusz Onyszkiewicz supported the possibility of borrowing aircraft from the United States, despite having criticized his deputy Romuald Szeremietiew for a similar statement a few days earlier. In September 1998, Janusz Onyszkiewicz announced that the military aircraft would be selected by the end of the year. However, towards the end of the year, both Jerzy Buzek and Janusz Onyszkiewicz gradually postponed the decision, first to January 1999, then to the summer of 1999, while simultaneously setting the introduction of the new fighter in 2000. The government, as recently as early 1999, was still providing deadlines for decisions regarding the loan of aircraft from the US.
The end of pretense?
In January 1999, an inter-ministerial commission was established under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Janusz Steinhoff, who began by stating very bluntly: “We still have a long way to go.” He was far from providing specific deadlines. His commission prepared the general economic assumptions for the future tender. Initially, the commission’s activities focused on drafting a bill for a multi-year NWSM procurement program (a new multi-role fighter aircraft), approving the Technical and Technical Specifications (T&T) requirements, the aircraft’s introduction program, defining the scope of the offset (70% allocated to the Polish Aviation Industry), and financing principles. Repayment of the purchase of 60 NWSM aircraft is scheduled to continue until 2015. Most payments are to be made after 2009, once Poland has resolved most of its Gierek debts (debts from the 1970s). The draft law on the acquisition of new aircraft and related amendments to other laws stipulate that the budget cannot allocate more than 0.05% of GDP annually for repayment.
On June 1, 1999, the Ministry of Economy issued requests for proposals (RFIs) to foreign companies offering military aircraft. Interested parties had until July 15, 1999, to respond. Manufacturers of the F-16, F/A-18, Mirage 2000-5, Gripen, and DASA responded with proposals to participate in the Eurofighter Typhoon program. Individual invitations were to be sent out in October 1999, with the goal of acquiring 60 military aircraft by 2004.
It is worth noting that the government’s modernization program for the Polish Armed Forces for the period 1998-2012 assumed the existence of 10 squadrons with 150 military aircraft. Due to the cost involved, the purchase of these aircraft must be implemented under a government program, not a departmental one. The number of 60 F-16s was a compromise between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense.
In October 2000, Janusz Steinhoff’s commission was tasked with deciding whether to accept the US government’s offer to loan 18 F-16s, worth $220 million. Consequently, a letter with additional inquiries was sent. However, the Polish-language press sparked an uproar, claiming it was a letter of intent. As a result, the US Congress began negotiations on the free loan of 16 F-16s to Poland. Minister Bronisław Komorowski held talks on this matter with Secretary of Defense William Cohen in Washington on November 8-9, 2000.
At that time, the Polish government was pushing for accession to the European Union. Sweden and France used this as blackmail, falsely accusing us of a lack of clear procedures.
On November 27, 2000, the J. Steinhoff Commission, through Bronisław Komorowski, sent further RFIs requesting information on economic cooperation to the UK, Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France. The RFIs were not sent to the US, as we had already obtained the necessary information. In response, we received: France – loan of 12 Mirage 2000-5 Mk.2s; the US – free loan of 14 F-16A Block 15 ADFs and 2 F-16B Block 10 OCUs; and Sweden – 16 Gripen Bakht 1s.
On April 12, 2001, the ambassadors of France, Sweden, the UK, and the US received in Warsaw the tender documentation for the delivery of new multi-role fighter aircraft for the Polish Air Force and Air Defense. The tender covers the purchase, lease, or loan of 16 WSBs by the end of 2003, with the purchase of 44 aircraft in subsequent years.
The argument is made that the US is only offering Poland the F-16 A/B. However, in reality, the 44 aircraft were to be F-16 C/D Block 50 and 52 variants, with production located in Poland. The law financing this program was adopted by the government on April 24, 2001, and the transaction value was estimated at $3.5 billion.
Potential difficulties were seen in the compensation agreements, i.e., the offset agreement signed in parallel. This agreement, in fact, determined the pace of the negotiations.
On April 24, 2001, Bronisław Komorowski stated that Poland was committed to selecting an aircraft that had been proven not only in peacetime conditions (“A Step Toward the F-16”). That same day, his deputy, Romuald Szeremietiew, said that the aircraft must have a known successor. According to the government’s intention, the selected WSB supplier should conduct a research and production program for the next-generation aircraft (a step toward the F-16 and Mirage 2000-5). According to him, Poland will spend $2.5-3.5 billion on the aircraft purchase.
On May 2, 2001, Jerzy Buzek’s government submitted the Act “Program to Equip the Polish Armed Forces with a Multi-Role Aircraft” to the Sejm. The Act was adopted on June 22, 2001.
On May 25, 2001, the Act “On the Reconstruction, Technical Modernization, and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces in 2001-2006” was passed, submitted to the Sejm on March 29, 2001.
Tender for the 60th Military Aircraft Company (WSB).
The Polish side set the award deadline at an unrealistic date, June 22, 2001. Aircraft deliveries were scheduled for the period 2003-2006, which was intended to enable Poland to meet its obligations “under the EA 1560 target.” The new multi-role fighter aircraft, designated the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft WSB, is expected to remain in service for at least 20 years. Invitations to tender were sent to manufacturers: the F-16 C/D Block 50/52 Lockheed Martin, Gripen International SAAB/BAE System, and Mirage 2000-5 Mk.2 Dassault Aviation.
The Ministry of National Defense tender committee, which conducted the substantive evaluation of the offers, was headed by Colonel Włodzimierz Pach, Deputy Director of the Armed Forces Procurement Department. The committee presented its recommendations to an inter-ministerial government commission, with an observer from the National Security Office of the President of the Republic of Poland. The government commission made the final selection. It was headed by Romuald Szeremietiew.
The inter-ministerial commission, or rather a mixed commission, was established on March 5, 2001, two weeks after the completion of the work of the so-called Steinhoff commission, which prepared the general economic assumptions for the future tender.
The so-called preliminary offer, used to qualify bidders for the second stage, the so-called shortlist, was to be submitted in Polish by May 30, 2001. The bid opening was planned for June 1, 2001. A joint committee evaluated the proposals and began negotiations with bidders qualified for the second stage. The winner was to be announced on June 22, 2001, and the contract was to be signed no later than June 31, 2001. Why? The goal was to arrive before the US Congress’s summer recess to ensure the fastest possible ratification. (Another step towards the F-16.)
In early 2001, the post-communist Polish government intended to introduce 60 aircraft into service by mid-2006. These were to be 44 new aircraft (32 single-seaters and 12 two-seaters). A further 16 used aircraft (12 single-seaters and 4 two-seaters), acquired by 2003, were to be acquired for the 1st NATO Reaction Force Squadron through purchase, lease, or loan with a repurchase option.
The tender covers the purchase of a logistics package, a specific set of combat assets, a dynamic air combat training system (AAC-MI), and 12 months of training for 100 personnel, including at least 6 experienced pilots. (Another step towards the F-16).
Another squadron will receive 16 aircraft, including 8 two-seaters, in 2004. Deliveries will be completed in mid-2006, with the delivery of 16 aircraft. The airfields/bases in Krzesiny and Malbork were selected for the aircraft. The aircraft were to be grouped into four squadrons: one for immediate response, two for rapid response, and one for combat improvement and retraining. Each aircraft was to fly 180 hours annually. Each aircraft was to be manned by 1.5 pilots. The process of selecting the next type was to begin in 2010, and the first aircraft should enter service in 2014.
Another attempt at the contract.
On June 15, 2001, the deadline for submitting bids expired (again). Bids were submitted by manufacturers of the F-16, Mirage 2000-5, and Gripen aircraft.
A scandal soon erupted after it was revealed that the government intended to engage a consulting firm. This is a shameful practice, practiced in Poland since the mid-1990s, which undermines the competence of those employed in various government entities. Compounding the tragedy were the enormous fees paid by the consulting firms. In the case of WSB, the fee was supposed to be 2-3% of the contract value, or $3.5 billion. There were also complaints that one of the bids was favored and that the deadlines were unrealistic (as mentioned above). However, everyone said that things were moving too slowly (certainly for those involved, but not for Poland). The confusion was undoubtedly caused by the upcoming parliamentary elections.
One of the main obstacles in the entire affair was undoubtedly Bronisław Komorowski, who first dismissed his deputy, Romulad Szeremietiew, and then pompously announced that the tender would be finalized on September 14, 2001. He also ordered special counterintelligence protection, including for the WSB program, as if it had previously been unnecessary.
In turn, communist Jerzy Szmajdziński, then in the parliamentary opposition, said in Kielce: “It would be imprudent to forgo the WSB purchase for cost-saving reasons, since this transaction could generate much-needed investments in the domestic arms industry.” These words came from a man who played a key role in the collapse of the Polish arms industry. After the parliamentary elections in October 2001, Jerzy Szmajdziński became Minister of National Defense, and Janusz Zemke was responsible for arms procurement. However, the bidding war for the contract completion date continued. The only success for Poland was the invalidation of the tender for legal services provided by a consulting firm.
Talks with manufacturers.
Talks began in early September 2001, with representatives from SAAB, BAE System, Lockheed Martin, and Dassault Aviation.
The situation remained bleak. Despite the relevant legislation in force, the final number of aircraft and the scope of the offset were unknown. In January 2002, a second round of talks began, focusing on industrial cooperation. The offers were unsatisfactory. Therefore, all governments were required to submit revised offers by February 28, 2002.
In February 2002, the number of aircraft actually acquired took shape. It was set at 48 WSBs, abandoning the plan to acquire 12-16 used aircraft. They will be replaced by German MiG-29s. The Sejm (lower house of parliament) approved the bill on March 20, 2002, and the President signed it on March 29, 2002.
In April 2002, the contract was valued at PLN 14 billion, and it was not ruled out that the bidders themselves would provide the loan. On June 7, 2002, the Sejm amended and passed the Act “On the Reconstruction and Technical Modernization and Financing of the Polish Armed Forces.” The Act had been passed only a year earlier. It is impossible to assess whether the changes made are beneficial to Poland.
Tender awarded. December 27, 2002.
On Friday, December 27, 2002, Lockheed Martin was officially announced as the winner of the WSB competition for Poland, scoring 90 points out of a possible 100. The declared offset amounted to over $9.5 billion (277% of the bid price), but after Poland’s conversion, the amount was $6 billion (170%). The defeated consortiums were Gripen International (JAS-39C/D Gripen), which scored approximately 90 points. The offset offer was expected to be approximately €7.5 billion (233%), but only €4.7 billion (146%) was accepted. And Dassault Aviation (Mirage 2000-5EPL/DPL), which was disqualified because the offered offset (€3.8 billion – 105%), after being recalculated by the Polish side, was valued at €2.1 billion, which represented only 60% of the contract value (Poland required at least 100%).
The first aircraft will be delivered in 2006. Deliveries will continue until 2008. The offer also includes a significant number of combat assets, modern electronic systems for mission preparation, navigation, guidance, training, ground equipment, and a training package. By selecting the F-16, Poland decided to commit to long-term American weapons technology. According to Deputy Minister of National Defense Janusz Zemke, the American offer was the most comprehensive. The committee awarded it 90 points out of a possible 100. The 23-member committee reached a unanimous decision. A total of 93 experts evaluated the individual bids. Talks with interested companies lasted 53 days.
However, the agreement may not be signed if the orders that US companies have committed to placing in Poland are not placed by the end of May 2003. In such a case, the government will begin negotiations with the manufacturers of the Gripen, which narrowly lost out to the F-16. This is significant, as the Ministry of Economy, through its secretary, Andrzej Szarawarski, has repeatedly emphasized that the offset proposals are far from satisfactory and that the Americans should supplement them. At the same time, the F-16 has not been assembled in Poland.
In 2004, training began in the US for 12 pilots and 140 ground crew. The first F-16 C/D Block 52 Advanced will arrive in Poland in the first quarter of 2006. Throughout 2006, 10 F-16 Cs and six F-16 Ds will be deployed to the 3rd ELT (Tactical Air Squadron) in Krzesiny. The squadron currently operates the MiG-21 bis. In 2007, the 10th ELT in Łask will be re-equipped and will receive 13 F-16Cs and 3 F-16Ds. In 2008, the 6th ELT in Powidz will receive the same number of aircraft. A total of 36 F-16Cs and 12 F-16Ds will be delivered, for a total of 48 aircraft. The squadrons will achieve initial operational capability in 2008, 2009, and 2010, respectively.
Contract. April 18, 2003.
On Friday, April 18, 2003, at the Air Force Military Training Center in Dęblin, a contract finalizing the delivery of 48 IFVs worth $3.5 billion was signed. Four contracts were signed on that day: the main contract, the financing agreement, the $3.8 billion loan agreement, and the offset agreement.
From the very beginning, pressure to select the F-16 for Poland was intense. Every possible means was utilized to achieve this. A dedicated website was even created. The press often cited statements such as the F-16 being the only fighter that met all Polish requirements. The choice of the F-16 is not surprising, but it hardly fits our reality. We even lost the option of final assembly of these aircraft in Mielec, which was an option. We’re not saying the F-16 is a bad aircraft; quite the opposite. It’s a refined and modern aircraft. However, the road to full utilization of the F-16 in the Polish Army will be very long.
Written by Karol Placha Hetman